Denver Law Review
Volume 68

Issue 1

Article 4

January 1991

Media Liability for Publication of Advertising: When to Kill the
Messenger
Matthew G. Weber

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Matthew G. Weber, Media Liability for Publication of Advertising: When to Kill the Messenger, 68 Denv. U.
L. Rev. 57 (1991).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

MEDIA LIABILITY FOR PUBLICATION OF
ADVERTISING: WHEN TO KILL THE MESSENGER

By MATTHEW G.

WEBER*

"The first bringer of unwelcome news hath
but a losing office."
Shakespeare**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Given the budgetary restraints facing local and national regulatory
and law enforcement agencies, it comes as no surprise that these agencies occasionally attempt to shift the cost of regulatory enforcement to
the private sector. A recent case arising under the Fair Housing Act
("FHA")' suggests that newspapers may be forced to play an increasingly active role in monitoring and regulating advertising copy where
the advertisement itself is deemed to pose a substantive danger of racial
discrimination. In Ragin v. New York Times Co.,2 Judge Haight of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the New York Times' ("Times") contention that the first amendment prohibits imposition of liability on a newspaper for printing
advertisements for the sale or rental of residential real estate featuring
predominately white models. The court reached this conclusion in denying the Times' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' discrimination claim
3
arising under section 3604(c) of the FHA.
This article discusses the grounds for the Ragin court's rejection of
the Times' constitutional defense. The Ragin opinion will be contrasted
with a subsequent decision granting a similar motion to dismiss on behalf of The Cincinnati Enquirer in Housing Opportunities Made Equal v.
Cincinnati Enquirer, ("HOME").4 This article examines the conflict between the two decisions in light of two rationales articulated by the
Supreme Court as justifications for the greater regulation of commercial
* Matthew G. Weber (B.A., Colorado College; J.D., Northwestern University
School of Law) is an attorney with Dow, Lohnes & Albertson in Washington, D.C. The
author wishes to thank Brent N. Rushforth and Jonathan D. Hart of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, and Asim Varma, Esq. of Washington, D.C. for their support and comments. The
author also thanks summer associate Karen A. Post for her valuable research assistance.
** Henry IV, Part II, Act I, Scene 1, line 100.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
2. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), certifiedforinterlocutory appeal, Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. 89 Civ. 0228 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
6, 1990)(1990 WL 26302, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2328).
3. Judge Haight dismissed claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the FHA, as
well as dismissing claims under 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1982 (1988) of the Civil Rights Acts of
1866 and 1870, and the thirteenth amendment of the Constitution.
4. Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 731 F. Supp. 801
(S.D. Ohio 1990).
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speech. The two rationales that have been articulated by the Supreme
Court for this greater regulation are: a commercial speaker's extensive
knowledge of his product and the hardiness of commercial speech. The
author contends that these two rationales provide the analytical tools for
determining whether advertising restrictions are constitutional as applied to newspapers or whether the restrictions constitute impermissible
attempts to shift the burden of regulatory monitoring to newspapers.
Accordingly, the final section of the article applies these two rationales
to the Ragin and HOME decisions and suggests that the latter decision is
more consistent with the Supreme Court's rationales.
II.

RAGIN v. NEW YORK TIMES Co.

In Ragin, individual black persons and Open Housing Center, Inc.,
a not-for-profit New York corporation devoted to promoting equal opportunity in housing in the New York metropolitan area, brought a discrimination action against the Times. 5 The Times, it was alleged, had
printed advertisements "featuring thousands of human models of whom
virtually none were black.... [T]he few blacks represented are usually
depicted as building maintenance employees, doorman [sic], entertainers, sports figures, small children or cartoon characters."'6 It was further alleged in the complaint that the Times had:
continued to print and publish numerous advertisements that
picture all-white models in advertisements for realty located in
predominantly white buildings, developments, communities or
neighborhoods. It has also printed and published a few advertisements that picture all black models in advertisements for realty located in predominately black
buildings, developments,
7
communities or neighborhoods.
The complaint alleged that the advertisements violated, inter alia, section

3604(c) of the FHA, 8 and various regulations promulgated thereunder. 9
5. Prior to filing suit, counsel for the plaintiffs met with the Times in 1987 to request
changes in the news paper's advertising policies. In February 1988, the Times published a
notice to its advertisers stating that it would not accept real estate advertisements failing to
display the "Equal Housing Opportunity" tag line recommended by the federal government or otherwise failing to comply with federal and state discrimination laws. The plaintiffs were not satisfied with these measures and filed suit. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 955.
6. Id, at 954 (quoting complaint,
12).
7. Id. at 955 (quoting complaint,
19).
8. Section 3604(c) of the FHA makes it unlawful:
To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any
such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
9. In implementing the FHA, the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") has promulgated regulations which provide, in part:
(a) Use of Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement, or slogan. All advertising of
residential real estate for sale, rent, or financing should contain an equal housing
opportunity logotype, statement, or slogan as a means of educating the homeseeking public that the property is available to all persons regardless of race [or]
color ....
(b) Use of human models. Human models in photographs, drawings, or other
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The Times moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the statute
did not proscribe the publication of the advertisements at issue. The
court rejected the Times' construction of the statute. The court noted
that the plaintiffs need not prove that the Times intended to express a
racial preference. 10 Rather, the court determined that the "ultimate issue for the finder of facts will be whether '[t]o an ordinary reader the
natural interpretation of the advertisements published [in the newspaper] is that they indicate a racial preference in the acceptance of tenMoreover, the court found the statute provided no
ants.' ' q
exemptions for newspapers. 1 2 Thus, the court concluded that the discrimination claim was not barred as a matter of statutory construction.
The court further found that the application of the statute to newspaper publishers would not violate the first amendment. Finding sup13
port in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,
the court reasoned that the facts alleged in the complaint, if found by
the jury to be true, would constitute unlawful activity, which would preclude the Times' constitutional defense, "since commercial speech con14
cerning unlawful activity is not protected by the First Amendment."
The Times sought to distinguish Pittsburgh Press on a factual basis,
arguing that the Times was more passive than the publisher in Pittsburgh
Press. In PittsburghPress, the publisher carried "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns (ie., "Jobs-Male Interest", "Jobs-Female Interest")15 in violation of a city ordinance. The Supreme Court
found that the column headings in combination with the advertisements
produced "essentially the same message as an overtly discriminatory
want ad," and were "in practical effect an integrated commercial stategraphic techniques may not be used to indicate exclusiveness because of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. If models are
used in display advertising campaigns, the models should be clearly definable as
reasonably representing majority and minority groups in the metropolitan area,
both sexes, and, when appropriate, families with children. Models, if used,
should portray persons in an equal social setting and indicate to the general public that the housing is open to all without regard to race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, and is not for the exclusive use of one

such group.
24 C.F.R. § 109.30 (a)-(b) (1990).
10. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 957.
11. Id (quoting, United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972)). The court in Hunter affirmed the lower court's injunction issued in a declaratory judgement action arising under § 3604(c) against a newspaper that
had printed a classified advertisement for a "white home." Hunter, 459 F.2d at 215.
12. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 957. The Ragin court cites Hunter,459 F.2d at 210, which
points to the statutory language making it "unlawful 'to make, print, publish, or cause to
be made, printed, or published' any advertisement prohibited by the Act." The Ragin
court further adopted the reasoning of the court in Hunter which goes on to explain that
"'landlords and brokers 'cause' advertisements to be printed or published and generally
newspapers 'print' and 'publish' them.'" Ragin, 726 F. Supp at 957 (quoting Hunter, 459
F.2d at 210).
13. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).

14. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 962 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)("The government may ban commercial speech related
to illegal activity .... ); Pittsburgh Press 413 U.S. at 388).
15. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 379.
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ment." 1 6 The Court upheld the ordinance, explaining that:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the
regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising
is incidental to a
17
valid limitation on economic activity.
Thus, Pittsburgh Press established that the state may regulate commercial
speech related to unlawful activity without satisfying the clear and present danger test applied in non-commercial speech cases.18
In Ragin, the Times argued that its role in printing advertisements
that emitted allegedly discriminatory signals was a "far cry" from the
active contribution of the column headings by the publisher in Pittsburgh
Press.19 The court rejected this passive/active distinction and stated that
only Congress could create an exception for passive publishers. 20 Similarly, the court rejected the argument that no cause of action had been
stated because the advertisements were not overtly discriminatory like
the advertisement in United States v. Hunter2 ' for a "white home."'2 2 The
court explained that "consistent use of exclusively or near-exclusively
white models may operate as the functional equivalent of more explicit
verbal racial messages." 23 For purposes of denying the Times' motion
to dismiss, the court found it possible that the plaintiff could show that
an ordinary reader would interpret the advertisements as indicating a
24
racial preference in the acceptance of tenants.
Relying on Bigelow v. Virginia,25 the Times argued that even if the
advertisements subtly implied a racial preference, the FHA improperly
shifted the burden of monitoring discriminatory advertising to the
press. 26 In Bigelow, the Court reversed the criminal conviction of an
editor of an underground newspaper which ran an advertisement for a
group which offered to help women obtain admittance to accredited outof-state abortion clinics. The Ragin court found Bigelow inapposite because "abortion is constitutionally protected whereas housing discrimi16. Id at 388.
17. Id at 389.
18. The clear and present danger doctrine originated with Justice Holmes' opinion in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)("The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are ofsuch a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent."). The most commonly cited articulation of the modem test states:
[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)(per curiam).
19. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
20. Id. at 963.
21. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d. 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
22. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
23. Id. at 963.
24. Id. at 957.
25. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
26. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
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nation is illegal." 27 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Posadas
de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 28 the Ragin court found
that "the undoubted power of Congress to ban discrimination in housing necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising which indicates a discriminatory preference." ' 29 The Ragin court adopted the
reasoning in Posadas that the state may regulate commercial advertising
where the underlying subject of the advertisement does not involve con30
stitutionally protected activities.
Finally, the Times argued that sufficiently onerous advertising restrictions violate the first amendment even when the underlying activity
is not constitutionally protected.3 1 For purposes of deciding the motion
to dismiss, the court in Ragin disposed of this argument by noting that
the burden of monitoring real estate advertisements for indications of
discriminatory preference might be less onerous than the cost of moni32
toring other types of advertisements, such as classified advertisements.
The court determined it was not necessary to determine the actual degree of burden for the purpose of deciding the motion to dismiss.33
The court concluded that the first amendment did not bar the section
3604(c) claim as a matter of law; accordingly, it denied the Times' mo34
tion to dismiss the claim.
27. Id at 963.
28. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986). Speaking for the Court in Posadas,JusticeRehnquist upheld, against a first amendment challenge, a local statutory scheme that permitted casino gambling in Puerto Rico
while prohibiting the advertising of such facilities to the public of Puerto Rico. The Court
stated that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the
lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling .... Id. at 345-46.
29. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
30. In Posadas,JusticeRehnquist distinguished the case at bar from two prior advertising cases on the ground that the prior cases involved constitutionally protected activities.
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345 (distinguishing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977)(striking down a ban on contraceptive advertising), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975)(reversal of a criminal conviction for advertising for an abortion clinic)).
Cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (advertisement for religious book cannot
be regulated as commercial speech).
31. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
32. Id. at 964.
33. Id at 963-64. For anecdotal support the court remarked that the Washington Post
in Spann v. Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 899 F.
2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990), had agreed to monitor real estate advertisements in a similar situation; however, the court in Ragin had "a parochial reluctance to conclude that what the
Washington Post can do to eliminate all the ads unfit to print, the New York Times cannot do."
Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 964 (emphasis in original). The court noted that the Washington
Post had consented to monitor real estate advertisements by agreeing:
to require specified black representation in different kinds of advertisements; recordkeeping of real estate display sections for three years; and enforcement by
means of notices to advertisers, monitoring compliance, and prohibition of advertisements if the advertiser did not comply, all the while keeping copies of such
notices for plaintiffs' inspection.
Jd,
The Washington Post reportedly agreed to ensure that 25%o of the models appearing
in its real estate advertisements would be black. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1987, at L34, col. 2.
34. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 964.
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HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES MADE EQUAL V. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,

35

Two months after Judge Haight issued the Ragin opinion, Chief
Judge Rubin of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio dismissed a similar section 3604(c) claim brought by HOME, a
non-profit corporation, against The Cincinnati Enquirer. The court in
HOME construed the Fair Housing Act claim without reference to the
36
Ragin decision.
The court in HOME determined that Congress intended to prohibit
two kinds of advertising by enacting section 3604(c). First, the statute
prohibits advertisements which communicate a discriminatory preference in an obvious and undeniable way, such as the ad in Hunter for a
"white home." 3 7T Second, the statute prohibits advertisements rendered
discriminatory through the proof of extrinsic circumstances which
demonstrate a discriminatory intent.3 8 The court found the complaint
failed to state allegations sufficient to state a claim under either theory
of liability.3 9 Significantly, the court in HOME specifically rejected the
notion that a newspaper could be held liable based on the racial composition of models in advertising, noting that "[s]ection 3604(c) cannot be
construed to require a newspaper to evaluate the racial proportions of
its advertising pages. The chilling effect of such a burden implicates
'40
First Amendment concerns."

In contrast, while the court in Ragin did not construe section
3604(c) as requiring strict proportionality, 4 1 it did find the plaintiffs had
stated a cause of action without making any allegations of extrinsic circumstances to support a finding of discriminatory intent. 4 2 Thus, as
35. Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 731 F. Supp. 801
(S.D. Ohio 1990).
36. The court did refer to the parallel case ofRagin v. Steiner, Clateman and Assocs.,
714 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); however, because this article discusses media liability
for publication of discriminatory advertising, Ragin v. Steiner should be distinguished because it involved the originator of the allegedly discriminatory advertising rather than the
publisher of the advertising as in Ragin v. New York Times. Judge Haight, in certifying the
Ragin v. New York Times order for interlocutory appeal, did refer to the HOME opinion.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Ragin v. New York Times Co., No. 89 Civ. 0228 (CHS)
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1990)(1990 WL 26302, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2328). See also infra note
45.
37. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 (citing United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.
1972). In another case brought under § 3604(c), a federal district court enjoined three
Chicago neighborhood newspapers from publishing classified advertisements which expressed explicit preferences for tenants and buyers of various nationalities. Holmgren v.
Little Village Community Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Il1. 1971). The court in Holmgren did not address whether there were any potential first amendment implications.
38. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 (citing Spann v. Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. 541,
546 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'don other grounds, 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
39. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804. The court noted that the Enquirer refused to change
its advertising practices after the plaintiffs requested such change, but concluded that "a
mere refusal to cease practices which are not actionable in the first instance does not provide evidence of intentionality." IL at 804 n.3.
40. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804.
41. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
42. Between the polar extremes of total exclusion, and strict proportionalism according to population percentages, the proof at trial may show sufficient numbers
of black models to achieve fair representation; or such a paucity of black models
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interpreted by the Ragin court, newspapers may be liable under section
3604(c) based solely on a genuine discrepancy between the racial composition of the models in advertising as compared to the racial composition in the target market without any extrinsic proof of discriminatory
intent. 43 This interpretation is irreconcilable with the HOME decision,
which specifically rejected the imposition of such a monitoring burden.4 4 Although neither decision engages in an extensive analysis of the
first amendment implications of this monitoring burden, 4 5 established
commercial speech doctrine provides the analytical framework to assess
the constitutionality of the Ragin court's interpretation of section
3604(c).

IV.
A.

ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Knowledge and Hardinessas Rationalesfor Regulation
of Commercial Speech

Commercial speech has been defined as speech that does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction." 4 6 An advertisement that does
as to constitute "tokenism." The factfinder could, in my judgment, lawfully conclude that proof of the former does not violate the FHA; but that proof of the
latter does offend a statute prohibiting advertisements which indicate a racial
preference.
I.d at 961.
43. In discussing the lack of an exact proportionality requirement, the court in Ragin
relied upon Spann v. Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. 541, 546 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In a subsequent case, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia characterized Spann v. Colonial Village as holding:
if in real estate advertisements some photographs feature white models, some
black models, and some of both, no violation of the [Fair Housing] Act occurs
merely because the races are not represented proportionately to population, or
because black models are not included in every display, unless an intention to
discriminate is shown by extrinsic evidence.
Spann v. Carley Capital Group, 734 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1988). This language is susceptible to more than one interpretation. The court in HOME read this language to preclude
any cause of action based upon the lack of proportionality alone, provided some black
models appeared. The court in Ragin seemingly limited the language to apply only "in
circumstances where there is no genuine discrepancy between the percentage of black
models used in an advertising campaign or practice and the percentage of blacks used in
the relevant community .. ." Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 960. Thus, according to the Ragin
court, where a genuine discrepancy does exist-as in Ragin where the plaintiffs alleged the
use of thousands of human models "of whom virtually none were black"-a cause of action could be stated based on the lack of proportionality without allegations of extrinsic
evidence of discriminatory intent. Id, at 961.
44. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 n.2; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
45. Indeed, in certifying the order denying the Times' motion to dismiss for appeal,
Judge Haight of the Ragin court noted that the court in HOME had reached "a conclusion
contrary to my own in what appears to be a comparable case (albeit, ifI may say so respectfully, without detailed analysis)." Memorandum Opinion and Order, Ragin v. New York
Times Co., No. 89 Civ. 0228 (CHS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1990)(1990 WL 26302, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2328).
46. Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(discussing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)). For discussions of the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine, see Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1977); DeVore, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico: The End of the
Beginning, 10 HAS-TINGS COMM. & ENr. UJ. 579 (1988); Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 (1979); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Free Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429
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not propose a commercial transaction is not treated as commercial
speech. 4 7 Thus, a political advertisement is not commercial speech
merely because a publisher is paid for its publication,48 or because the
speaker may have been motivated by financial gain. 49 In short, the existence of "commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing
the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment." 50 On
the other hand, a proposal for a commercial transaction cannot be elevated above commercial speech merely by linking the proposal to a cur51
rent issue of public concern.
Because commercial speech is regarded as less worthy of first
amendment protection 52 than non-commercial speech, 55 it received little constitutional protection 54 before the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.55 In Virginia Board, the Court struck down a ban on truthful
56
price advertising of prescription drugs on first amendment grounds.
While the Virginia Board decision dramatically increased the protection
(1971); Schmidt & Bums, Proofor Consequences: FalseAdvertising and the Doctrineof Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1273 (1988); Comment, Common Sense and Commercial Free Speech,
48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1121 (1987).
47. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)(political
advertisement treated as non-commercial speech in libel context).
48. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 818 (1975)(newspaper); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266 (newspaper); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959)(books).
49. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 109 S.Ct. 2678,2684 (1989); Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
50. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966), reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 934
(1966).
51. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028
(1989)(tupperware parties treated as commercial speech despite incidental teaching of
home economics); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)(advertise-ments
treated as commercial speech even though condoms were linked to birth control and venereal disease); Central Hudson Gas & Elec., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5
(1980) (advertisements treated as commercial speech despite fact that electricity ads were
linked to energy conservation); Fargo Women's Health Org., v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176,
181 (N.D. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986)(advertisements for anti abortion counseling clinic linked to pro life movement).
52. See Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979)(arguing that commercial speech should receive no first
amendment protection).
53. The Court and commentators have "emphasized the role of the First Amendment
in guaranteeing our capacity for democratic self-government." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 n. 19 (1976). See also
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-70. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).

54. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding conviction for violation of ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 n.1, 54 (1942)(upholding statute prohibiting
distribution of any "handbill, circular . . . or other advertising matter whatsoever in or
upon any street" because "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising."). But see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
(reversing criminal conviction of editor for printing advertisement for legal out of state
abortion clinic services).
55. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
56. Id at 773.
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previously afforded commercial speech, 5 7 the Court recognized that the
first amendment permitted greater regulation of commercial speech
than of other categories of speech.5 8 For example, the Court acknowledged the state's power to regulate false and misleading advertising. 59
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission,60 the
Court developed a four-part test for assessing the legality of restrictions
on commercial speech. According to the CentralHudson test, commercial
speech is unprotected if it is misleading or if it concerns unlawful activ61
ity. If the speech is protected, the government must demonstrate
three additional elements: (1) the government must show a substantial
state interest, (2) the regulation must directly advance the governmental
interest asserted, and (3) the regulation must not be more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.6 2 Unless the government can
meet all four elements of the Central Hudson test, an advertising regulation will be struck down. Nevertheless, the Central Hudson test permits
much greater regulation than the tests applicable to non-commercial
63
speech.
As justification for the lesser protection afforded commercial
speech, the Court in Virginia Board advanced two "commonsense differ57. In recognizing first amendment values underlying commercial speech, the Court
in Virginia Board remarked:

So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation
of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say
that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.
Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted)(footnotes omitted).
58. irginia Board,425 U.S. at 770. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978), reh'gdenied,439 U.S. 883 (1978), the Court, relying on Virginia Board, indicated
that the failure to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech:
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [first]
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than
subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression.
Id at 456.
59. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771.

60. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
61. The burden ofjustifying the restriction is on the party seeking to uphold it. Id. at
570.
62. Idat 566. The last requirement has been relaxed since CentralHudson. The word
"necessary" does not imply that the means must be the least restrictive means available.
Rather, it merely means there must be a reasonable "'fit' between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.' " Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of
New York v. Fox, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3035 (1989)(quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
63. For instance, while commercial speech may be regulated on the basis of its content, non-commercial speech generally cannot be so regulated. See, e.g., Erznoznik v.Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)(striking down content-based municipal ordinance
prohibiting the showing of films with nudity whenever the theater screen could be seen
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ences" between commercial speech and other categories of speech.6 4
First, the Court cited the "greater objectivity" of commercial speech:
"[t]he truth of commercial speech... may be more easily verifiable by
its disseminator than ...news reporting or political commentary, in that
ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows
more about than anyone else." 6 5 Secondly, the Court asserted that
"commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood
of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely." 6 6 Subsequent decisions, including Central Hudson, have consistently accorded
commercial speech less protection than other forms of speech on the
two common-sense distinctions of knowledge and
basis of 6these
7
hardiness.
1. The Knowledge Rationale as Applied to Newspapers
The first justification for permitting greater regulation of commercial speech turns upon the knowledge of the commercial speaker. Because commercial speakers are assumed to have extensive knowledge of
from the street). But see Note, The Content Distinctionin Free Speech Analysis after Renton, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1904 (1989)(suggesting that the content distinction may be eroding).
The prior restraint doctrine is another example of the different level of protection
afforded commercial speech: "it is quite clear that prior restraint on commercial speech is
allowed to an extent which would not be allowed toward other forms of protected speech."
Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Iarson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 180 (N.D. 1986)(citing Virginia
Bd. Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
64. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See also Central Hudson 447 U.S. at 562;
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-456 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977). For arguments that these two factors do not distinguish commercial speech from traditionally protected speech, see Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, supra note 46 at 385-86; Comment, Common Sense and Commercial Free
Speech, supra note 46 at 1133.
65. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
66. Id
67. In Central Hudson, the court found:
Two features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content. First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and
the lawfulness of the underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.' CentralHudson, 447
U.S. at 564 n.6 (citation omitted).
Prior to Central Hudson, the Supreme Court in Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)
stated:
Because [commercial speech] relates to a particular product or service, commercial speech is more objective, hence more verifiable, than other varieties of
speech. Commercial speech, because of its importance to business profits, and
because it is carefully calculated, is also less likely than other forms of speech to
be inhibited by proper regulation.
See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. 433 U.S. 350, 383 ("Since the advertiser knows his
product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech."). Cf.Dun & Bradstreet, v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)(citation omitted)("[T]h. speech here
[credit report], like advertising, is hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state
regulation.... Arguably, the reporting here was also more objectively verifiable than
speech deserving of greater protection.").
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their products, "they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their
messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity."' 68 This assumption regarding the commercial speaker's knowledge significantly influences the legal tests applied to commercial speech. For example, as
Justice Stewart observed in his concurring opinion in Virginia Board,6 9
liability for factual inaccuracies rests upon the proof of actual malice in a
libel case involving a public figure, 70 whereas liability for factual inaccuracies in advertising may be imposed without such proof pursuant to
state and federal false and deceptive advertising statutes. 7 1 Similarly, in
non-commercial speech cases, the Brandenburg test, from Brandenburgv.
Ohio,7 2 requires a factual inquiry into the speaker's knowledge and intent to incite imminent unlawful action when the speaker is prosecuted
for speech inciting unlawful activity. 73 In stark contrast, the commercial
speech doctrine rests upon the assumption that commercial speakers
have extensive knowledge concerning their products. 74 Therefore, the
75
intent requirement is less stringent than in the Brandenburgtest.
As a practical matter, the Court's assumption of knowledge seems
appropriate when the speaker produces or markets the goods or services
being advertised. 7 6 This assumption, however, should not apply with
68. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
69. Virginia Board,425 U.S. at 776-77. Justice Stewart relied on the knowledge rationale to justify greater regulation of truth in commercial speech:
In contrast to the press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts from
sketchy and sometimes conflicting sources under the pressure of publication
deadlines, the commercial advertiser generally knows the product or service he
seeks to sell and is in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual representations before he disseminates them.
Id at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-349 (1974).
71. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1988); see also Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294,
308-09 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980)(unwitting retailer not exempt from
operation of federal dissemination of false advertising statute). Some statutes regulating
the unlawful practice of unconscionable commercial advertising, however, exempt publishers when they have "no knowledge of the intent, design or purpose of the advertiser." See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-421(b) (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989).
72. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See also supra note 18.
73. The Court explicitly recognized an intent element to the Brandenburg test in Hess
v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973). But see Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Re-examined: Dissonancein the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1169 n.26 (1970) (contending that the intent requirement should be irrelevant). See generally Shiffrin, Defamatory
Non-Media Speech and FirstAmendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 947 n.205 (1978).
74. See supra text accompanying note 65, cf. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Arguably, the reporting here [credit report] was also more objectively verifiable
than speech deserving of greater protection. In any case, the market provides a
powerful incentive to a credit reporting agency to be accurate, since false credit
reporting is ofno use to creditors. Thus, any incremental "chilling" effect of libel
suits would be of decreased significance.
Id. at 762-63 (citation omitted).
75. See Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973). Still, as the Fifth Circuit has vividly illustrated, a commercial speaker does not lose
constitutional protection "whenever the advertised product might be used illegally. Peanut butter advertising cannot be banned just because someone might someday throw ajar
at the presidential motorcade." Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 743 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
76. Several commentators have questioned whether a commercial speaker's knowl-
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equal force to newspapers because they are poorly situated to evaluate
the truth of the claims made and the legality of the products being advertised in their publications. Recognizing the publisher's relative ignorance concerning the underlying products, courts before7 7 and after 78
Virginia Board have refused to impose tort duties upon publishers to verify information contained in advertisements appearing in their
publications.
The Court's "common sense" distinction regarding a commercial
speaker's knowledge cannot logically be extended to apply to newspapers. Instead of assuming a newspaper's knowledge, a court should
make a factual inquiry into the extent of the publisher's knowledge in
determining whether a publisher can be found liable for printing advertisements related to unlawful conduct. For instance, in Norwood v. Soldier
of FortuneMagazine,79 the plaintiff brought a negligence action against a
magazine for publishing advertisements for professional mercenaries
reading in part, "GUN FOR HIRE," "All jobs considered" and "NAM
sniper instructor." The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment because "[r]easonable jurors might conclude that a reasonable person shouldn't be especially surprised when he learns that the
gun that had been hired through his advertisement was used to do one
of the things that guns often do and are designed to do-hurt people." 80 Thus, the court in Norwood determined that publishers may lose
their first amendment protection when they fail to detect blatant advertisements related to unlawful activity. 81 Subsequent to this determinaedge is different from a political speaker's knowledge, even where the commercial speaker
is in the chain of distribution. See, e.g., Farber, Commercial Speech and FirstAmendment Theoty,
supra note 46, at 385-86 (arguing commercial speech is not necessarily more verifiable than
political speech).
77. See Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 NJ. Super. 207, 322 A.2d 824 (1974)(publisher had no
duty to investigate and test fireworks advertised in magazine); Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch,
129 Misc. 2d 477, 493 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1985)(summary judgment granted to defendant after
court found no duty to verify information in "personal" classified advertisements); Suarez
v. Underwood, 103 Misc. 2d 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1980)(court refused to impose on
newspaper the "onerous burden" of investigating safety of advertised scalp treatment).
But see Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (1969)(dismissal reversed in part, holding that magazine that endorsed defective shoes with "Good
Housekeeping's Consumers' Guaranty Seal" may be liable to purchaser relying on endorsement for subsequent injury).
78. See, e.g., Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir.
1989)(rejecting wrongful death claim arising out of classified ad), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 729
(1990); Pittman v. DowJones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La. 1987)("a newspaper
has no duty, whether by way of tort or contract, to investigate the accuracy of advertisements placed with it which are directed to the general public, unless the newspaper undertakes to guarantee the soundness of the products advertised"), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1987); Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1122, 241 Cal. Rptr.
101, 102-03 (1987)(declining to impose duty to investigate the safety of tampons advertised in magazine); Gutter v. DowJones, 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986)(allegations that reader relied on non-defamatory negligent misrepresentation of fact in a news
article in choosing a securities investment which resulted in financial loss insufficient to
state a claim).
79. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
80. Id. at 1402.
81. Id. at 1399-1400. Accord Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) ("We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally
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82
tion, the Norwood case reportedly settled.
Courts have refused to impose tort duties where liability is based
upon more subtle solicitations for unlawful services or products. For
instance, when presented with a factual setting similar to the Norwood
case, the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite result in Eimann v. Soldier of
FortuneMagazine,8 3 albeit without reaching the first amendment issue. In
Eimann, the same magazine had published an advertisement reading in
part, "EX-MARINES--67-69 'Nam Vets, Ex-DI, weapons specialistjungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk assignments, U.S. or overseas. "84
The advertisement was answered by a man who offered $10,000 to have
his wife murdered.8 5 Finding the magazine was negligent for printing
the advertisement, a Texas jury awarded the decedent's mother and son
$1.9 million in compensatory damages and $7.5 million in punitive
86
damages.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the judgment, stating that "[g]iven the pervasiveness of advertising in
our society and the important role it plays, we decline to impose on publishers the obligation to reject all ambiguous advertisements for products or services that might pose a threat of harm." 8 7 Consistent with the
analysis employed in Norwood, the court in Eimann found that "[w]ithout
a more specific indication of illegal intent than [the mercenary's] ad or
its context provided, we conclude that SOF [the magazine] did not violate the required standard of conduct by publishing an ad that later
played a role in criminal activity." 8 8 Thus, the traditional negligence
duty analysis applied by the courts in Norwood and Eimann does not assume, as the commercial speech doctrine does, that publishers have extensive knowledge of the products and services advertised in their
publications. Instead, the courts have consistently applied the reasona89
bleness standard.

2.

The Hardiness Rationale as Applied to Newspapers

The hardiness rationale for permitting greater regulation of commercial advertising is based upon the assumption that stricter regulation
will not chill commercial speech because of the economic benefits to be
derived from advertising. 90 This rationale, like the knowledge rationale,
could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting
prostitutes.").
82. "Gunfor Hire" Had Many Clients - Bumbling Gang ofKillers Left Trail of Death, Terror,
L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
83. Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 1989).
84. Id at 831.
85. Id
86. Id at 833.
87. Id at 838.
88. Id.
89. For an argument that liability in such situations should be imposed only when the
ad promotes a likelihood of lawless conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious
bodily harm, see Shapiro & Olson, Advertiser Liability: SoldierofFortune Cases Take Deadly Aim
at Publishers, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 383 (1989).
90. See supra notes 64, 66-67 and accompanying text. Cf. South Carolina State Ports
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makes sense when applied to those in the chain of distribution, i.e., the
producers, marketers, and retailers of goods and services. Advertising
increases profits for those in the chain of distribution by increasing sales
of the underlying product. Consequently, those in the chain of distribution have an incentive to protect those profits by making investments to
comply with advertising regulations. If necessary, they can pass these
costs along to consumers in the form of higher prices for their products
or services.
Publishers, by contrast, have little economic incentive to expend resources to comply with advertising regulation. In particular, classified
advertisements depend on high volume and low cost for profitability.
Classified advertisements would no longer be profitable if newspapers
were forced to engage counsel to review each one. 9 1 Moreover, publishers generally do not receive greater advertising revenue in proportion to
the success of the products they advertise. Because the link between the
success of the advertised products and the bottom line is more attenuated for the publisher than for the producer, publishers do not have the
same economic incentive as producers to overcome the chilling effect of
92
regulation.
The court in Walters v. Seventeen Magazine,98 vividly illustrated the
danger of this chilling effect in affirming the dismissal of a complaint
seeking to hold the defendant liable for failing to investigate the safety
of tampons advertised in the defendant's magazine:
Such a tort would require publications to maintain huge staffs
scrutinizing and testing each product offered. The enormous
cost of such groups, along with skyrocketing insurance rates,
would deter many magazines from accepting advertising, hastening their demise from lack of revenue. Others would comply, but raise their prices beyond the reach of the average
reader. Still others would be wiped out by tort judgments,
never to revive. Soon the total number
of publications in circu94
lation would drop dramatically.
As the Walters court recognized, publications simply do not have the
same economic incentives or resources to comply with advertising regulation as those in the chain of production. Even if publishers had more
incentives, they would face an insurmountable burden in attempting to
Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 346,350 (D.D.C. 1987)(footnote omitted)(finding "little concern that 'regulation' by way of a negligence cause of action will
chill such expression or diminish the free flow of commercial data ....
The fact-based
expression exemplified by the Booz-Allen report should prove quite hardy against the
'threat' of negligence actions.").
91. See infra note 113.
92. In refusing to impose tort liability upon a publisher for failing to investigate fireworks advertised in a magazine, the court in Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 NJ. Super 207, 322
A.2d 824, 825 (1974) observed that "[itlo impose the suggested broad legal duty upon
publishers of nationally circulated magazines, newspapers and other publications, would
not only be impractical and unrealistic, but would have a staggering adverse effect on the
commercial world and our economic system."
93. Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119,241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1987).
94. Id at 1122, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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acquaint themselves with the particular facts concerning each of the numerous and varied products advertised in their publications.
B.

Monitoring Burden as a Function of Knowledge and Hardiness

While the Central Hudson test 9 5 provides no protection for speech
related to unlawful activity, the Court has acknowledged the distinction
between the prohibition of illegal activity and the imposition of monitoring burdens, noting that "the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of
distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful." 9 6 Accordingly, courts and
practitioners assessing advertising regulations as applied to publishers
should be sensitive to the chilling effect presented by such regulation,
particularly where the statute making the publication of the advertisement unlawful may contravene the first amendment.
The doctrinal foundation for such sensitivity is found in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.9 7 In Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida "right of reply" statute that granted political candidates the right to
equal space to reply to criticism by a newspaper, free of cost to the candidate. The Court held the statute invalid on two grounds: (1) the statute exacted a penalty based upon the content of the newspaper, since
the paper was forced to incur additional costs and devote additional
space to print the candidate's reply; and (2) the statute intruded upon
the editorial discretion of the editors, because, even if there were no
costs associated with the reply, the statute forced the editors to print
material they otherwise would not have printed. The Court observed
that:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for
news, comment and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on
the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with the First Amendment
98
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
Thus, a regulation that intrudes upon a newspaper's editorial discretion
as it relates to non-commercial speech contravenes the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press.
Subsequent decisions have cited Tornillo in rejecting claims of private litigants seeking to compel newspapers to print their advertisements. 99 More significantly, the courts in Memphis Publishing Co. v.
95. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
96. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
97. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
98. Id. at 258.
99. See Cyntje v. Daily News Publishing Co., 551 F. Supp. 403, 406 (D.V.I. 1982)(refusing to compel newspaper to print advertisement containing plaintiff's political views);
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Leech 10 0 and News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Board of County Commissioners10 '
relied on Tornillo in rejecting attempts by regulators to impose monitoring burdens on newspapers to ensure compliance with content-based
advertising regulations.
In Leech, the court struck down a Tennessee statute that required
publications that printed advertisements from out-of-state liquor retailers to publish a warning 10 2 adjacent to each such advertisement. While
the court in Leech found no evidence that the statute would exact an unconstitutional penalty by decreasing advertising revenue, the court concluded the statute nevertheless interfered with editorial discretion in
"accepting and preparing the copy for commercial advertising." 10
Specifically, the court remarked that the "forced choice between foregoing copy or publishing that which would not otherwise be published is
04
the state-imposed dilemma which was disapproved in Miami Herald."'
The court in Leech distinguished Pittsburgh Press by noting that the ordinance upheld there regulated illegal commercial activity involving gender-based discrimination whereas the statute at issue in Leech involved
105
the regulation of advertising for legal liquor sales in other states.
Given that the regulation involved advertising for legal commercial activity, the court found the Central Hudson test applied rather than the
10 6
Pittsburgh Press analysis.
Similarly, the court in Sun-Sentinel struck down a local ordinance
making it a misdemeanor for a newspaper to publish advertisements for
contracting services without ensuring that contractors included their
"certificate of competency" number issued by the county. 10 7 Although
the ordinance arguably regulated advertising for unlawful activity, to wit,
Person v. New York Post, 427 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)(citation omitted)(refusing to compel newspaper to print "tombstone" advertisement announcing a securities offering because "[a] court may no more tell a privately owned newspaper what
not to print than what to print. That commercial advertising is involved makes no
difference.").
100. Memphis Publishing Co. v. Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
101. News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 693 F. Supp. 1066
(S.D. Fla. 1987).
102. The notice in Leech read: "WARNING: The importation or transportation of alcoholic beverages into the State of Tennessee by any person not possessing a permit from
the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission is a Criminal Offense which could be punished by FINE or IMPRISONMENT or BOTH." The notice had to "be printed in a space
equal to or greater than thirty percent (30%) of the total space devoted to each such advertisement in print no smaller than the largest print type employed in such advertisement." 539 F. Supp. at 407.
103. Id. at 411.
104. Id. at 410 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Torillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58
(1974)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 411. But see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986)(arguably establishing rule that would permit more intrusive
regulation of advertising whenever the underlying commercial activity was not constitutionally protected, regardless of whether the legislature had banned the activity in
question).
107. In the alternative, the ordinance permitted the publisher to obtain an affidavit
from the contractor stating that a certification number was not required. Sun-Sentinel, 693
F. Supp at 1067.
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the unlicensed provision of contracting services, the court in Sun-Sentinel
did not find PittsburghPress controlling. Instead, the court distinguished
PittsburghPress based on the degree of the publisher's participation. The
publisher in Pittsburgh Press created the sex-designated help-wanted columns, whereas the publisher in Sun-Sentinel could not "be said to have
employed a policy which affirmatively or directly aided in the incompetent or fraudulent provision of contracting services."' 0 8 The court further distinguished Pittsburgh Press on the ground that the sex
discrimination ordinance upheld there did not impose a penalty on the
publisher.' 0 9 In contrast, the court found the ordinance in Sun-Sentinel
imposed a significant monitoring cost on an otherwise passive publisher,
rendering it constitutionally infirm. 1 10 The court in Sun-Sentinel engaged in a detailed examination of the ordinance's financial impact on
the paper and determined that complying with the ordinance would cost
$8,580 a year.' 1 ' The court recognized, however, that the burden of the
ordinance should not be considered in isolation:
Beyond the burden imposed by [the ordinance], the possible
imposition of additional burdens by the County (or the State)
must also be considered in order to fully gauge the Ordinance's
constitutional implications. The County might, for example,
place similar duties on the press concerning other types of
services or other types of advertising directed at consumers.
Other counties might do the same. The State could, of course,
pass legislation similar to [the ordinance], a practice which
could spread to other states. The cumulative burden which
might be placed on publications by such legislation "would impair, perhaps severely, their proper functioning." The threat
presented by [the ordinance] 2is, then, to the institutional viability of the press as a whole.'1
As the court in Sun-Sentinel recognized, if such ordinances were upheld, the number of regulations that could potentially apply to a publisher would be limited only by the types of products or services
advertised in the publisher's publication."13 Faced with increasing regu108. ld at 1071.

109. Id at 1072 n.15.
110. Id at 1072-73.
I11. The court found that compliance with the ordinance would require twenty workhours per week or an estimated $8,580 per year. Id at 1068.
112. Sun-Sentinel, 693 F. Supp. at 1072-73 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)(quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975)).
113.. The court in Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch declined to find a duty to monitor classified
advertisements after engaging in an analysis similar to the court in Sun-Sentinel:
The classified advertisements which run in its newspaper serve at least two functions-they are an integral part of and facilitator of commerce in the area served
by the paper, and they underwrite in part the cost of publication of the newscarrying vehicle. It demands little imagination to conceive the consequences with
respect to such advertisements if the publisher were required to verify authorization for publication of each classified ad-even by telephone communication as
suggested by plaintiff-or to run the risk of imposition of damages for mental
anguish which might follow publication of an unauthorized ad. With the volume
of classified ads printed daily (typified by the more than 3000 ads handled by
defendant's paper in a month), a need for pre-publication telephone authorization-surely involving multiple calls to make contact in at least some instances-
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latory penalties, publishers would be forced to choose between hiring
staffs of lawyers, engineers, and scientists to review proposed advertising copy for potential violations or foregoing advertising copy for entire
categories of products and services. 14 While such an imposition might
be justified when applied to other industries, Tornillo teaches that such
an imposition cannot pass constitutional muster when applied to the
5
press. 1

V.

THE FHA: KNOWLEDGE DECREASES BURDEN

Section 3604(c), as construed by the court in HOME, does not appear to impose an unconstitutional burden. In HOME, the court found
the plaintiff must show discriminatory intent by demonstrating either
that: (1) the advertisement was overtly discriminatory, or (2) that there
were extrinsic circumstances of discriminatory intent coupled with a disproportionate number of models of one race in the advertisements. 16
In the first instance, the newspaper's firsthand knowledge of the contents of the paper decreases the burden of ferreting out overtly discriminatory advertisements. 1 7 For example, the burden of identifying the
advertisement for a "white home" in Hunter 118 was no greater than the
burden of identifying an advertisement reading "gun for hire" in Norwould impose an unreasonable burden on a daily newspaper, accompanied of
course by increased cost in this form of advertising, so frequently used by the
casual advertiser.
Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch, 129 Misc. 2d at 479, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
114. Memphis Publishing Co. v. Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Tenn. 1982)(statute
declared unconstitutional because it forced publishers to choose between foregoing copy
or publishing that which would not otherwise be published). Cf. Eimann v. Soldier of
Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989). In Eimann the court rejected imposition
of tort duty based in part on the fact that "the publication's editorial content would surely
feel the economic crunch from loss of revenue that would result if publishers were required to reject all ambiguous advertisements." Idl at 837.
115. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. See also Sun-Sentinel, 693 F. Supp. at 1073.
116. Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 731 F. Supp. 801,804
(S.D. Ohio 1990).
117. In United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972), the court determined that:
a publisher can readily determine from the face of an advertisement whether it is
intended to express a discriminatory preference. However the language of the
advertisement is couched, the purpose of an advertiser who wishes to publish an
advertisement in violation of the [Fair Housing] Act is to communicate his intent
to discriminate and a newspaper publisher can divine this intent as well as any of
his readers.
I- at 213. In Ragin, however, the alleged discriminatory preference is less overt than in
Hunter. Thus, even though the newspaper has access to the allegedly illegal product, the
monitoring burden could still be significant. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying
text.
118. The court in Hunter concluded that the first amendment did not bar injunctive
relief where the defendant newspaper had published an advertisement for a "white home."
In reaching this conclusion, the court gave little weight to the newspaper's "recital of possible economic damages to a publishing business operating under such a court order."
Hunter,759 F.2d at 213. Both HOME and Ragin support the application ofinjunctive relief
in cases involving such overt discrimination. The HOME opinion, however, is decidedly
more sensitive to the chilling effect of imposing monitoring requirements where the alleged discrimination rests upon the newspaper's ability to "predict a market fraught with
variables." HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 n.2.

1991]

MEDIA LIABILITY

wood.19 Given the slight burden imposed, the first amendment poses
no bar to restricting this overtly discriminatory form of commercial
speech. The burden on speech is not increased under the second
method of demonstrating intent because the newspaper cannot be
found liable merely for failing to monitor the racial composition of the
models.1 20 Instead, as articulated by the court in HOME, this second
method requires the plaintiff to show extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent before liability will attach. 12 Thus, the burden again seems
permissible.
The Ragin court's interpretation of section 3604(c) presents more
troubling constitutional implications. Unlike the court in HOME, the
court in Ragin found that a plaintiff could state a viable cause of action
based upon a genuine discrepancy in the racial mix of models as compared to the racial mix of the relevant community.' 2 2 Arguably, the
knowledge rational articulated in Virginia Board113 applies with more
force to newspapers with respect to section 3604(c) claims than with respect to claims related to underlying products, such as product liability
claims, because section 3604(c) regulates an unlawful product that is
24
within the newspaper's sphere of knowledge, the advertisement itself.1
Thus, a plaintiff could argue that a newspaper may be presumed to have
extensive knowledge of this regulated product, just as any commercial
speaker is presumed to have knowledge concerning its product under
the analysis employed in Virginia Board.125 Based on this presumed
knowledge, the plaintiff could contend that applying section 3604(c) to a
newspaper is less onerous than imposing product liability tort duties on
newspapers because the burden of requiring newspapers to monitor the
contents of their own publication is far less burdensome than requiring
them to perform safety evaluations on products underlying their
26
advertisements.'
This argument, however, recognizes only a fraction of the potential
burden imposed under the Ragin court's interpretation of section
3604(c). Although the newspaper could determine the race of the models by looking to the four comers of the advertisement, it would also
have to measure each advertisement, or each real estate section, against
prior advertisements or sections to ensure that the individual advertisement or section was not part of a continuing pattern of discrimination. 12 7 Even if the newspaper could accurately index the racial mix of
119. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying note 65.
124. Section 3604(c) liability is not necessarily related to the underlying real estate
transaction. Indeed, section 3604(c) imposes liability for discriminatory advertising even
where the underlying real estate transactions are entirely legal. See Holmgren v. Little
Village Community Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
125. See supra text accompanying note 65.
126. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
127. The statute of limitations applicable to section 3604(c) claims exposes newspapers
to liability for advertisements printed before the two year limitation period if the plaintiff
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all its real estate advertisements over a period of time, that information
would be meaningless without a determination of the racial proportions
of the relevant market. The determination of the racial mix of a particular real estate market requires expertise outside a newspaper's knowledge. As the court in HOME explained, "[r]equiring real estate
advertisers, let alone news publications, to determine the racial mix of
the population within the boundaries of their target market in advance
of publishing an advertisement imposes an unrealistic and onerous duty
to predict a market fraught with variables."' 28 Thus, as construed by
the court in Ragin, section 3604(c) imposes a potential monitoring burden even greater than the burden imposed by the ordinance declared
12 9
unconstitutional in Sun-Sentinel.

Moreover, the hardiness rational articulated in Virginia Board13 0 is
lacking for newspapers attempting to comply with section 3604(c). A
realtor has significant economic incentive to perform the kind of sophisticated market analysis necessary to assess accurately the racial
demographics in real estate markets because the realtor stands to benefit directly from the sale or rental of the property. As the commercial
speech doctrine presumes, it is the realtor's business to know the
demographics of the market. While it may be the newspaper's business
to know about its advertising and advertising markets, it does not have
the same incentive to engage in the types of studies necessary to determine the racial composition of relevant real estate markets. The newspaper does not stand to benefit directly from the sale of the underlying
real estate. Given the newspaper's lack of knowledge and lack of economic incentive to acquaint itself with real estate demographics, the
chilling effect of section 3604(c) as construed by the Ragin court could
alleges a pattern of discrimination. Pursuant to the FHA, a private litigant must bring a
civil
action "not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged
discriminatory housing practice...." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1988). Where, however,
a plaintiff alleges that a series of advertisements form a "continuing violation," the complaint may be based on advertisements printed more than two years prior to the complaint, provided the last asserted occurrence of the practice falls within the two year
period. See Havens Realty, v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982)(footnote omitted)(where plaintiff alleges "unlawful practice that continues into the limitation period, the
complaint is timely when it is filed within [the limitations period] of the last asserted occurrence of that practice."); Spann v. Colonial Village, 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(claim of
continuing practice of discriminatory advertising held timely where last allegedly discriminatory advertisement fell within statutory period). The continuing violation doctrine dramatically increases the monitoring burden upon newspapers by extending the window for
liability beyond the two year period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1988).
128. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 n.2.
129. In Sun-Sentinel, the newspaper could have avoided liability by examining a single
proposed advertisement to ensure it contained the advertiser's certificate of competency
number. This exercise involved no special skill or expertise. Nevertheless, the court declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it diverted resources away from the newspaper's other editorial functions. Under the standard imposed by Ragin, the diversion of
resources is even greater because a newspaper cannot avoid liability merely by examining
the advertisement itself. It must also determine whether the racial composition of the
advertisement, combined with other advertisements previously published, reasonably approximates the racial composition of the community. See supra note 127.
130. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

1991]

MEDIA LIABILITY

rise to a constitutionally impermissible level.13 1
Procedurally, the court in Ragin crafted its opinion within the context of a motion to dismiss. Thus, the door remains open to defenses
turning upon facts established during discovery or at trial. For example,
the order denying the Times' motion to dismiss arguably does not preclude a motion for summary judgment by the Times' raising a first
amendment defense based upon the burden of monitoring real estate
advertisements. As discussed above,1 32 that burden should not be considered in isolation. It may be difficult, however, for the Times to marshall sufficient facts to establish an onerous burden if the court
interprets the FHA as requiring only a loose fit between the proportion
of blacks featured in the advertising and the number in the relevant market. 133 On the other hand, the closer the court comes to requiring exact
proportionality, the more likely the Times can persuasively argue that it
lacks the knowledge of the target markets necessary to ensure mathematical proportionality. i3 4 Thus, the disposition of the Times' first
amendment arguments may well turn on how strictly the Ragin court
construes the proportionality requirements of section 3604(c).
At trial, the jury might be receptive to the Times' observation that
the allegedly discriminatory signals emitted by the use of white models
over time were less overt, and therefore less susceptible to detection by
the newspaper, than the explicit use of sex-designated column headings
in PittsburghPress or the use of the words "white home" in Hunter. Since
a violation of section 3604(c) occurs only when the advertisements indicate a racial preference "to the ordinary reader,"' 3 5 the Times may be
able to convince the jury that a reasonable person would not find the
advertisements discriminatory.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Even under the standards imposed by Ragin, it appears the first
131. But see Comment, Advertisingfor Apartheid: The Use of All White Models in Marketing
Real Estate as a Violation of the FairHousing Act, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1429 (1988)(arguing that
section 3604(c) passes CentralHudson test).
132. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
133. The decision in Ragin contains dicta that supports a loose fit requirement. For
instance, the court rejected the Times' assertion that the plaintiffs sought to require "a
specific number of black models in advertisements" as a "straw man argument." Ragin,
726 F. Supp. at 959. The court noted the plaintiffs had instead challenged the Times'
alleged" 'practice ofprinting and publishing advertisements with virtually all human white
models in a city with a significant population of blacks and other minorities ..... ' " Id
(quoting plaintiffs' brief). If the court subsequently adopts a loose fit interpretation, the
Times might be presumed to have knowledge of the contents of its own paper and the
existence of a significant minority population in New York City.
134. Significantly, the court in Spann noted that if§ 3604(c) did require that real estate
developers use exact mathematical proportionality in their advertisements there would be
"the broader problem of the chilling effect of such burdens on advertisers' ability and
desire to advertise, implicating First Amendment concerns." Spann, 662 F. Supp. at 546.
Based on the knowledge and hardiness factors underlying commercial speech doctrine, the
chilling effect of imposing an exact proportionality requirement on passive publishers
would be even greater than the effect on developers and realtors.
135. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 964.
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amendment bars the imposition of mandatory monitoring requirements
in two situations. First, a newspaper may be protected in those rare instances where the advertisement relates to a constitutionally protected
activity as in Bigelow. Second, a newspaper may be protected where the
cost of complying with the monitoring requirement would impose a significant financial burden on the newspaper as in Sun-Sentinel. In both
these classes of cases, counsel may be able to avoid litigation by persuading regulatory authorities that the application of the monitoring requirement to newspapers contravenes the first amendment.
In private actions falling in the second class of cases, the newspaper
should structure its legal arguments to demonstrate that it lacks the
knowledge of the underlying product necessary to monitor effectively
the truth and legality of the advertisements. The newspaper should also
emphasize that it lacks the economic incentive that endows the traditional commercial speaker with hardiness. Ragin cautions, however, that
the lack of hardiness may not preclude a plaintiff from piercing the first
amendment defense where the unlawful product is the advertisement
itself. Accordingly, the newspaper should emphasize aspects of the
monitoring burden that do not appear on the face of the advertisement
or that require knowledge outside the newspaper's expertise. Regardless of the ultimate disposition of the Ragin case, Judge Haight's denial
of the Times' motion to dismiss teaches that a newspaper confronts an
uphill battle in arguing that it faces a significant burden in monitoring its
own product for overt forms of discrimination.

